We aimed to conduct a scoping review to assess the profile of retracted health sciences articles authored by individuals affiliated with academic institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). We systematically searched seven databases (PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, Embase, Medline/Ovid, Scielo, and LILACS). We included articles published in peer‐reviewed journals between 2003 and 2022 that had at least one author with an institutional affiliation in LAC. Data were collected on the year of publication, study design, authors' countries of (...) origin, number of authors, subject matter of the manuscript, scientific journals of publication, retraction characteristics, and reasons for retraction. We included 147 articles, the majority being observational studies (41.5%). The LAC countries with the highest number of retractions were Brazil (n = 69), Colombia (n = 16), and Mexico (n = 15). The areas of study with the highest number of retractions were infectology (n = 21) and basic sciences (n = 15). A retraction label was applied to 89.1% of the articles, 70.7% were retracted by journal editors, and 89.1% followed international retraction guidelines. The primary reasons for retraction included errors in procedures or data collection (n = 39), inconsistency in results or conclusions (n = 37), plagiarism (n = 21), and suspected scientific fraud (n = 19). In conclusion, most retractions of scientific publications in health sciences in LAC adhered to international guidelines and were linked to methodological issues in execution and scientific misconduct. Efforts should be directed toward ensuring the integrity of scientific research in the field of health. (shrink)

Giving Voice To Values (GVV) serves as a framework to teach individuals methods to speak up when they witness actions that are contrary to their professional and personal values. This essay illustrates how GVV serves as a catalyst to advance both research and teaching activities.

The second messenger molecules cAMP and Ca2+ regulate a large number of eukaryotic cellular events. cAMP acts on protein kinases and Ca2+ works through a ubiquitous calcium‐binding protein, calmodulin. The two systems are not independent, however, but interact in several important fashions. These interactions, and, in particular, the modulation of the cAMP signal by two Ca2+/calmodulin‐regulated proteins, cyclic nucleotide phosphodiesterase and calcineurin, are described here.

Reason and quest for revelation, by P. Tillich.--On the ontological mystery, by G. Marcel.--The problem of non-objectifying thinking and speaking, by M. Heidegger.--The problem of natural theology, by J. Macquarrie.--Metaphysical rebellion, by A. Camus.--Psychoanalysis and religion by E. Fromm.--Why I am not a Christian, by B. Russell.--The quest for being, by S. Hook.--The sacred and the profane; a dialectical understanding of Christianity, by T. J. J. Altizer.--Three strata of meaning in religious discourse by C. Hartshorne.--The theological task, by J. B. (...) Cobb.--Theology and objectivity, by S. A. Ogden.--Can faith validate God-talk? by K. Nielsen.--The logic of God, by J. Wisdom.--Mapping the logic of models in science and theology, by F. Ferré.--On understanding mystery, by I. T. Ramsey.--Teilhard de Chardin; a philosophy of precession, by E. R. Baltazar.--The nature of apologetics, by H. Bouillard.--Metaphysics as horizon, by B. Lonergan.--Deciding whether to believe, by M. Novak. (shrink)

Many philosophers accept a nonreductive physicalist view of at least some special sciences, which is to say that while they assert that each particular referent of any special science term is identical to some referent of a physical term, or token physicalism, they deny that special science types are identical to physical types. The most commonly cited reason for this position is Jerry Fodor's antireductionist argument based on the multiple realizability of many special science terms. I argue that if (...) token physicalism is true, as nonreductive physicalists believe, then this multiple-realization argument fails to preclude reductive physicalism. (shrink)

Contemporary Materialism brings together the best recent work on materialism from many of our leading contemporary philosophers. This is the first comprehensive reader on the subject. The majority of philosophers and scientists today hold the view that all phenomena are physical, as a result materialism or 'physicalism' is now the dominant ontology in a wide range of fields. Surprisingly no single book, until now, has collected the key investigations into materialism, to reflect the impact it has had on current thinking (...) in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and the theory of value. The classic papers in this collection chart contemporary problems, positions and themes in materialism. At the invitation of the editors, many of the papers have been specially up-dated for this collection: follow-on pieces written by the contributors enable them to appraise the original paper and assess developments since the work was first published. The book's selections are largely non-technical and accessible to advanced undergraduates. The editors have provided a useful general introduction, outlining and contextualising this central system of thought, as well as a topical bibliography. Contemporary Materialism will be vital reading for anyone concerned to discover the ideas underlying contemporary philosophy. David Armstrong, University of Sydney; Jerry Fodor, Rutgers University, New Jersey; Tim Crane, University College, London; D. H. Mellor, Univeristy of Cambridge; J.J.C. (shrink)

Recently there has been a great deal of argument about what justifies references to representational states in explanations of behavior. I discuss Jerry Fodor's claim that it is necessary to ascribe representational states to organisms that respond to "nonnomic properties" of stimuli. Zenon Pylyshyn's (apparently equivalent) claim that it is necessary to ascribe representational states to organisms that respond to "nonprojectable properties" of stimuli and Fodor's claim that an organism's ability to respond to nonnomic properties of stimuli is a (...) criterion of its having representational states. I argue that if Fodor's account of how organisms respond to nonnomic properties of stimuli is correct, we could always replace explanations that appeal to nonnomic properties of stimuli with explanations that appeal only to nomic properties of stimuli. I also argue that, according to Fodor's account, we could not determine whether an organism is responding to nonnomic properties of stimuli unless we already knew whether the explanation of the response includes a reference to a representational state. Thus, given Fodor's account, there is no noncircular way of arguing that it is necessary to ascribe representational states to organisms because they respond to nonnomic properties of stimuli. Finally, I argue that Fodor has not actually provided an account of how organisms respond to nonnomic properties of stimuli and I discuss the prospects of a different strategy for linking the nonnomic properties of stimuli to representational states. (shrink)

In G.K. Chesterton’s The Man who was Thursday, six of the seven anarchists named after different days of the week turn out to be secret policemen. Chesterton’s hero Syme finds himself opposed to not just a disparate group of anarchists, but to the unified forces of authority. A similar thing seems to have happened in recent years to Jerry Fodor. When Fodor published The Language of Thought in 1975 his targets were, as he says, ‘a mixed bag’: reductionists, behaviourists, (...) empiricists, operationalists, holists and various followers of Wittgenstein. But today these disparate targets have become distilled into one movement, which Fodor calls ‘pragmatism’. Fodor sees pragmatism (‘perhaps the worst idea that philosophy ever had’) everywhere, and one aim of this sequel to The Language of Thought is to stamp it out. (shrink)

Contents Preface General Introduction 1 | Science and Pseudoscience Introduction Karl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research? Imre Lakatos, Science and Pseudoscience Paul R. Thagard, Why Astrology Is a Pseudoscience Michael Ruse, Creation-Science Is Not Science Larry Laudan, Commentary: Science at the Bar---Causes for Concern Commentary 2 | Rationality, Objectivity, and Values in Science Introduction Thomas S. Kuhn, The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions Thomas S. Kuhn, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and (...) Theory Choice Ernan McMullin, Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science Larry Laudan, Kuhn’s Critique of Methodology Helen E. Longino, Values and Objectivity Kathleen Okruhlik, Gender and the Biological Sciences Commentary 3 | The Duhem-Quine Thesis and Underdetermination Introduction Pierre Duhem, Physical Theory and Experiment W. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism Donald Gillies, The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis Larry Laudan, Demystifying Underdetermination *Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, The Duhem Problem Commentary 4 | Induction, Prediction, and Evidence Introduction Peter Lipton, Induction Karl Popper, The Problem of Induction Wesley C. Salmon, Rational Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Criteria of Confirmation and Acceptability Peter Achinstein, Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight? *Nelson Goodman, The New Riddle of Induction Commentary 5 | Confirmation and Relevance: Bayesian Approaches Introduction Wesley C. Salmon, Rationality and Objectivity in Science *Deborah G. Mayo, A Critique of Salmon’s Bayesian Way *Alan Chalmers, The Bayesian Approach Paul Horwich, Therapeutic Bayesianism Commentary 6 | Models of Explanation Introduction Rudolf Carnap, The Value of Laws: Explanation and Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation Carl G. Hempel, The Thesis of Structural Identity Carl G. Hempel, Inductive-Statistical Explanation Peter Railton, A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation *Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification *James Woodward, The Manipulability Conception of Causal Explanation Commentary 7 | Laws of Nature Introduction A. J. Ayer, What Is a Law of Nature? Fred I. Dretske, Laws of Nature D. H. Mellor, Necessities and Universals in Natural Laws Nancy Cartwright, Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts? Commentary 8 | Intertheoretic Reduction Introduction Ernest Nagel, Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations Paul K. Feyerabend, How to Be a Good Empiricist *Jerry A. Fodor, Special Sciences Philip Kitcher, 1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences Commentary 9 | Empiricism and Scientific Realism Introduction Grover Maxwell, The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities Bas C. van Fraassen, Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism Alan Musgrave, Realism versus Constructive Empiricism Larry Laudan, A Confutation of Convergent Realism *Juha T. Saatsi, On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies Ian Hacking, Experimentation and Scientific Realism David B. Resnik, Hacking’s Experimental Realism *Martin Carrier, What Is Right with the Miracle Argument Arthur Fine, The Natural Ontological Attitude Alan Musgrave, NOA’s Ark---Fine for Realism Commentary Glossary Bibliography Name Index Subject Index. (shrink)

"A collection of essays that addresses philosophical aspects of the films of Quentin Tarantino, focusing on topics in ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, language, and cultural identity"--Provided by publisher.

Papers presented at the International Seminar on Film & Philosophy, held at Kozhikode during 26-30 September 2000.